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Abstract 
 
 
Corn markets are important for many industries, including the seed, fertilizer, meat 
production/processing and agricultural machinery sectors, all of which are highly concentrated. 
Oligopoly theory suggests that corn input and field equipment suppliers likely benefit from 
policies that support corn markets, such as U.S. biofuels policy, while meat companies are 
likely adversely affected. Employing a linear two-factor (S&P 500 and corn prices) equilibrium 
asset pricing model, this study investigates the impact of biofuels policy on U.S. agribusiness 
and food processing firm stock prices. Conditional heteroskedasticity in stock returns is 
accounted for using a GARCH(1,1) model. Corn price increases are found to have positive 
effects on excess stock returns for seed, fertilizer and machinery companies, while the impact 
on meat companies is negative. The results may be interpreted as evidence that crop input 
suppliers gain from U.S. biofuels policy while meat processors lose. 
 
Keywords: biofuels policy, excess stock returns, GARCH effect, linear factor model.  
 
JEL Classification: D43; L13; Q14. 
1.  Introduction 
Corn ethanol production in the United States increased from 3.9 million gallons in 2006 to 9.0 
million gallons in 2008 (RFA, 2009). U.S. corn use in ethanol production increased from about 
5% of production in the mid 1990s to about 30% in the 2008/09 crop year (FAPRI, 2009). This 
shift in use has been due in no small measure to the substantial support provided by the U.S. 
government. Policies to promote demand for ethanol have taken the forms of a blender’s tax 
credit, blending mandate and international trade restrictions (Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008). Not 
surprisingly, corn prices have risen. Average U.S. corn prices traded in the $1.80-$3.00 per 
bushel range over the 30 years leading up to 2006, deviating mainly because of large supply-
side shocks. Since 2006, however, corn prices have risen to trade consistently above $3.00 per 
bushel in spite of an increase in acres planted. 
The corn market is critical for many input suppliers. Seed costs account for about 14% of 
total corn production costs in Iowa (Duffy and Smith, 2008), while fertilizer and machinery 
costs amount to about 23% and 20% of total costs, respectively. Corn is the dominant crop in 
the U.S. Midwest, and its price correlates strongly with other field crop prices. Prices correlate 
because the commodities can substitute in use, and also because an increase in corn acres 
means a decrease in acres planted to other crops and/or an increase in overall acres under 
crops. Thus, a demand-driven increase in corn prices should be reflected in an increase in 
demand for agricultural inputs. Corn is also an important input in many markets, most notably 
in meat markets. Corn accounted for about 24% of total costs in the feeder-to-finish pig 
business in Iowa in 2009 (Ellis et al., 2009). 
Many field crop input markets are concentrated in structure. This may be because, as is the 
case with phosphate and potash, control of deposits is concentrated. Or, as is the case with the 
crop seed industry, some firms have invested heavily over many years in developing high-
quality foundation seed. In addition, formal intellectual property rights over yield-enhancing 
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and cost-reducing traits give certain firms strong competitive advantage and constitute a barrier 
to entry. 
The agricultural machinery manufacturing industry requires intensive technology and 
capital investments, as well as complementary knowledge over a wide range of equipment 
lines. High fixed costs in product development need to be recouped in a limited market so that 
there can only be room for a handful of competitors. Concentration also exists in corn use 
markets, including North American poultry and hog production/processing. The reasons for 
this are less clear, but large integrated processors may have access to better-quality animal 
genetics. They may also be better positioned to coordinate with retailers in delivering the meat 
qualities that consumers demand, and to work profitably with the heavily concentrated North 
American grocery sector.  
Our concern is with how biofuels policy, and by extension corn prices, affect agribusiness 
stock prices. We wish to establish whether investors in share-traded corn input suppliers gain 
from biofuels policy and whether investors in meat processors lose. These outcomes will arise 
if the business is possessed of some form of bargaining power over corn growers. Related work 
concerns the capacity of landowners to extract higher rents for crop land when crop 
profitability rises. For example, Kirwan (2009) has sought to establish how agricultural 
subsidies are distributed between the landlord and the tenant. He found that 25% is captured by 
the landlord through increased rent. Presumably land scarcity in the vicinity of the tenant’s 
farming operation endows the landlord with some bargaining power. In this paper we ask 
whether share markets indicate that input suppliers have the power to participate in the 
pecuniary good fortune that biofuels have brought to corn farmers, and whether meat 
processors are adversely affected. 
Study of agribusiness stock price determination has been limited. Turvey et al. (2000) 
employ various measures, including share prices and capital asset pricing model returns, to 
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analyze the relationship between economic value added (EVA) and stock market performance 
among seventeen Canadian food processing companies. High EVA is not found to be 
correlated with higher shareholder value. Using different data sets, Sparling and Turvey (2003) 
revisit the issue and support the same results. A related line of research has used event study 
methods to measure effects of economic events on firm values (MacKinlay, 1997; Henson and 
Mazzocchi, 2002; Jin and Kim, 2008). But that approach is infeasible in the current context. It 
is difficult to define policy events and to anticipate the event window given the variety of 
historical biofuels policies, their modifications and the lack of objective clarity in establishing 
when markets anticipated legislation.  
In empirical finance, the multifactor model proposed by Fama and French (1993, 1996) has 
been found to successfully explain average portfolio returns. Related studies investigating and 
documenting the relationship between multiple factors and asset returns for the U.S. financial 
market include, for example, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), McElroy and Burmeister (1988) and 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996). In this study, we employ a two-factor model when analyzing 
excess returns of stock prices for leading companies in the crop seed, fertilizer, machinery and 
poultry/pork industries. The sample industries have the common characteristic that corn is 
either a major user or input, and thus corn price changes induced by U.S. biofuels policy are 
expected to affect the firms’ profitability significantly.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the standard oligopoly theory model is 
reviewed to establish what microeconomic theory has to relate about how price movements 
affect profits in imperfectly competitive markets, and thus how share prices should be affected. 
The market environments for the companies in the study are then provided. Section 4 presents 
the empirical model and describes the data. Estimation results are summarized and analyzed in 
Section 5. We conclude with some suggestions for further research in the area.  
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2.  The Microeconomic Model 
Our empirical analysis will consider oligopolist input suppliers to corn producers, and also 
oligopolist meat producers for which corn is a major input. In order to establish how biofuels 
policy should affect agribusinesses, we develop a microeconomic model of sectors supplying 
inputs for corn production. Farm-level production is given as 1 2( , , , ... , )Ky f s x x x= , where  
represents the input at issue and 
s
1x  through Kx  represent other inputs. Input prices are given as 
sw  and  through 1w Kw
{ ,
 with the obvious assignments. For convenience, other inputs are 
summarized as 1 2 , ... , }KX x x= x  while other input prices are summarized as W . 
Producers are price takers, where the corn price is given as ( )P θ , with θ  as an exogenous 
biofuels policy variable where ; i.e., an increase in the policy variable increases 
demand for corn. The producer’s problem is to arrive at 
( ) 0Pθ ⋅ ≥
(1) ( ) , 1( ), , max ( ) ( , ) ,Ks s X s i iiP w W P f s X w s w xθ θ =Λ ≡ − −∑  
with dual supply and factor demand functions as  
(2) 
( )
( )
( )
*
*
*
Supply : ( ), , ;
: ( ), , ;
Other inputs : ( ), , , {1, ... , }.
s
s
i s
y P w W
s s P w W
x P w W i K
θ
θ
θ ∈
 
Our particular concern is with how demand for input s responds to the policy variable. Namely, 
does  apply? Given ( )* *( ), , / ( ) ( ) 0s Ps P w W s Pθθ θ∂ ∂ ≡ ⋅ ⋅ ≥ ( ) 0Pθ ⋅ ≥ , the condition is that * ( )Ps ⋅  
, i.e., the input is normal rather than inferior (Chambers, 1988).  0≥
Limited econometric information is available on whether this assumption applies for 
fertilizer, seed and machinery, in part because of data aggregation across crops and inputs. The 
data that are available, mainly for fertilizer and machinery, provide mixed but generally 
supportive results (McKay, Lawrence and Vlastuin, 1983; Huffman and Evenson, 1989). In 
addition, the law of supply requires that output increases in response to an increase in own 
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price so that some input must increase. If an input decreases in response to an increase in the 
output price, then some other input must substitute for it. Given the importance and distinctive 
roles that macronutrients, seed and machinery play in the crop production process, it is hard to 
imagine a plausible technology with substitution so strong as to render any of these inputs as 
inferior. 
If we agree that biofuels policy should increase demand for these inputs, then the next 
question is how the increase in demand should affect profitability for input suppliers. The 
markets are oligopolistic, and the effect of demand shifts on oligopoly profits has been 
addressed in the literature, most notably by Quirmbach (1988). In the exposition to follow, we 
briefly present Quirmbach’s reasoning to show how stock prices should respond to biofuels 
policy innovations. Upon aggregating over farm-level demands for an input, we arrive at a 
market-level inverse factor demand function for, say, seed as ( ; )S Q θ  where .  ( ) 0Sθ ⋅ ≥
Let there be a fixed number  of the input producing companies labeled as  
, or n  to abbreviate, where each produces  so that . Each firm 
is held to be identical with cost function  so that nth firm profit is  
N n∈
n{1,2, ... , }N ∈Ψ nq nQ ∈Ψ≡ ∑ q
n
( )nC q
(3) ( ) ( ; ) ( ).n nS Q q C qθ θΠ ≡ −  
With ( / ) /n nq Q dQ dqnβ ≡
0n n
 as the nth firm conjectural variation, perfect competition is given 
by β ≡ ∀ ∈Ψ , cartel behavior to support the monopoly solution is given by 1n nβ ≡ ∀ ∈
N n
 
, and the symmetric Cournot quantity-setting solution is given by Ψ 1 /nβ ≡ ∀ ∈Ψ . The 
restriction [0,1]nβ ∈  is imposed; otherwise, the conjectured response would be outside the 
bounds of reasonable beliefs about influence on market price.  
Writing ( ; ) ( ; )R Q S Q Qθ θ≡  as industry revenue, and  as firm marginal cost, 
consider the symmetric solution with 
( )q nC q
/nq Q N n= ∀ ∈Ψ  and n nβ β= ∀ ∈Ψ  so that the firm 
subscript may be omitted. Then simple algebra shows that the standard optimization condition 
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for an oligopolist is  
(4) ( ) (1 ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( / ) 0,n Q q
n
d S Q R Q C Q N
dq
θ β θ β θΠ ≡ − + − =  
with equilibrium value for aggregate output as . If the conjectural variation is independent 
of the demand shifter, then
*Q
1  
(5) 
* [(1 ) ( ; ) ( ; )]
;Q
S Q R QdQ
d
θ θβ θ β θ
θ
− +≡ − Ω  
where (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /Q QQ qqS R C Nβ βΩ = − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅  while 0Ω <  is the standard, and quite intuitive, 
convention. 
As pointed out by Quirmbach, (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0QS Rθ θβ β− ⋅ + ⋅ <
0⋅ ≥ ( ) 0QR θ
 is conceivable since  can be 
negative and of sufficient absolute magnitude. In that case the policy shift makes industry 
marginal revenue decline so that there is private incentive to reduce output, even among 
oligopolists who do not share all of the gains from their own efforts to reduce supply. Since 
 and , attribute 
( )QR θ ⋅
( ) ( ) ( )Q QR QS Sθ θ⋅ ≡ ⋅ + ⋅θ ( )Sθ ⋅ <  requires that . This means 
that an increase in the value of 
( ) 0QS θ ⋅ <
θ  makes the inverse demand function more negatively sloped, 
i.e., less elastic. Thus, and though unlikely, it is conceivable that equilibrium input production 
decreases with the advent of policies intended to promote corn-based ethanol. Were (QR θ ) 0⋅ ≥ , 
so that industry marginal revenue shifts up with an increase in θ , then it is certain that 
. But that may not be to the benefit of oligopolists, as the shift may reduce their 
pricing power. 
* / 0dQ dθ ≥
Of direct relevance to our empirical analysis is the effect on aggregate profits in 
equilibrium, *( )θΠ . The derivative is2  
                                                 
1 This is equation (3) in Quirmbach (1988). 
2 See equation (7) in Quirmbach. 
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(6) 
{ }* *
Term II: ?Term I: 0
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,Q q
R Cd QS
d N Nθ
θ *dQ
dθ θ
≥
⋅ − ⋅Π ≡ ⋅ +

 
where (4) ensures that . Thus, if 
, then both terms I and II are positive and input industry profits will certainly 
increase upon the advent and strengthening of biofuels policy intended to promote demand for 
corn. But when , as is more likely the case, then term II is negative, and we cannot 
preclude the possibility that the policy decreases industry profits.  
*( ) ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )] (1 ) ( ) 0Q q Q QR C R S Q Sβ β⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ ≤
/ 0dθ >
* /dQ dθ ≤ 0
*dQ
To summarize our analysis to this point, two possibilities need to be acknowledged. They 
are generally unlikely to occur but may be relevant in some settings. One is that an input is 
inferior in corn production so that input demand declines with the strengthening of policy that 
promotes corn biofuels. The other is that the biofuels policy shifts demand up but does not 
rotate demand to be too inelastic, such that output expands greatly and oligopolist profits 
decline.  
For the sake of completeness, we present how standard theory would suggest that biofuels 
policy will affect share prices. If the firm’s discount factor is  and firm profits are otherwise 
constant over time, then the (continuous time) discounted present value model identifies the 
company value as  
r
(7) 
*( )( ) ,V
r
θθ Π=  
so that the sign of *( ) /d dθ θΠ  in (6) determines the effect on the share price. Based on the 
above reasoning, the main hypotheses that we wish to test are that an increase in the level of 
corn prices should (i) increase the rate of returns for companies supplying inputs to crop 
agriculture, and (ii) decrease the rate of returns for companies using corn as an input.  
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3.  The Companies 
In order to test these hypotheses, we choose a sample of sixteen companies from concentrated 
industries likely to be materially affected by corn prices. In the crop seed industry we choose 
Pioneer/DuPont, Monsanto and Syngenta. Seed costs account for about $94 per corn acre in 
Iowa (Duffy and Smith, 2008), while about 85 million corn acres are sown each year in the 
United States. Pioneer, long the dominant supplier of corn seed, was purchased by DuPont in 
1999. Its market share in corn seed was above 40% of production through much of the 1990s 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004) but was believed to have declined to about 30% by 2008 (Gerson 
Lehrman Group, 2008). The agricultural seed and nutrition sector accounted for about 25% of 
DuPont sales over the 2007 and 2008 accounting years and a slightly smaller percentage of 
gross profits.3  
Monsanto’s interest in seed markets arose from the realization that glyphosate tolerant seed 
would promote sales of its patented Roundup herbicide, i.e., complementarity in demand exists 
between tolerant seed and the herbicide. The company first licensed seed trait technologies in 
the middle 1990s, but it also decided to enter the seed business directly. Through grower 
demand for seed traits and seed company purchases, the company’s share of the corn seed 
market grew to about 25% in 2008 (Gerson Lehrman Group, 2008). To the extent that higher 
corn prices would increase the sale of all seed, it would also increase profits from the 
herbicide. Corn seed and traits accounted for about 36% of total gross profits over the 2006, 
2007 and 2008 accounting years. Albeit with a smaller corn seed market presence, Syngenta 
also seeks to exploit complementarity between seed and agrichemicals. Over the accounting 
years 2007 and 2008, seed sector activities were attributed an average of 21% of company 
sales and 19% of company gross profits.  
The major crop macronutrients are nitrogen, potash and phosphate. Corn is the most 
                                                 
3 Unless otherwise stated, company financial data are from audited reports retrieved from 
company websites on 8/4/09 and 8/5/09. 
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fertilizer-intensive among major field crops grown in the United States. Nitrogen, phosphate 
and potash account for expenditures of about $73, $54 and $35, respectively, per grown acre in 
Iowa (Duffy and Smith, 2008). Macronutrient markets are international, but location does 
matter, as the commodities are bulky and some chemical forms can be volatile. The five 
companies we consider are Agrium, CF Industries, PotashCorp, Mosaic and Terra Nitrogen, 
specialists in agricultural crop macronutrient fertilizer and allied markets.  
Both potash and phosphate deposits are mined so that ownership of deposits determines 
capacity to benefit from demand growth.4 While available data are not definitive, PotashCorp 
and Mosaic each control 13% or more of global potash deposits. Morocco is the largest 
phosphate exporter, competing in the North American market with PotashCorp and Mosaic. 
PotashCorp controls about half of North American phosphate deposits while Mosaic controls a 
further third. Agrium and CF Industries are smaller players in this market. 
Commercial nitrogen production for crop fertilization is produced primarily through the 
Haber-Bosch process, which uses natural gas to remove nitrogen from the atmosphere. As 
such, nitrogen fertilizer can be produced at low cost in parts of the world where natural gas is 
cheap. Yara International, an Oslo commodity merchandiser, has a 25% share of the global 
trade in ammonia fertilizers. Utilizing plentiful natural gas in Trinidad (off the Venezuelan 
coast) for much of its production, PotashCorp is the second-largest global nitrogen producer, 
with about 16% of world trade. Agrium and CF Industries both have a somewhat smaller 
presence in these markets. Terra Nitrogen is much smaller and focuses on North American 
nitrogen markets.  
The four meat sector companies we consider are Pilgrim’s Pride, Tyson, Sanderson Farms 
and Smithfield Foods. According to Hendrickson and Heffernan (2007), the four-firm 
concentration ratio in broiler processing was 58.5% circa 2006-07. The largest chicken 
                                                 
4 Information is from company websites, retrieved 8/3/09. 
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producer, Pilgrim’s Pride, with about 25% of the market in the United States, declared 
bankruptcy in late 2008, in some measure because of rising corn prices. Tyson was second 
largest, with about 20% circa 2006, and Sanderson Farms was fourth largest, with about 5%.5 
The third-largest firm, Perdue Farms, is privately held.  
With about 31% of the market, Smithfield Foods is the largest pork processor in an 
industry in which the four-firm concentration ratio is about 66% (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 
2007). As with broiler processors, Smithfield is heavily vertically integrated back through the 
production chain and owned about 1 million sows during much of the 2000-09 period. With its 
Butterball brand, Smithfield is also the largest turkey processor in the United States. Tyson is 
the second-largest pork processor in the United States and also has a strong presence in the 
highly concentrated beef packing market.  
We also consider the three dominant players in the U.S. farm machinery sector. These are 
Deere & Co., CNH, and AGCO in descending order of company sales. All three provide a full 
line of agricultural field machinery, including tractors, combines, planters and cultivation 
equipment. Deere & Co. and CNH are also diversified into construction equipment markets 
whereas AGCO is focused on the agricultural sector. Machinery expenditures can amount to 
$100 or more per corn acre planted (Duffy and Smith, 2008). An increase in corn prices is 
likely to increase acres planted, and also to increase intensity of cultivation on those planted 
acres. Furthermore, new farm machines are very expensive: the typical tractor for row cropping 
costs about $150,000 while a combine costs about $200,000. Farmers tend to purchase when 
cash flow is strong, i.e., when corn prices are high.  
Though the nature and levels of exposure differ across these sixteen companies, all are 
heavily exposed to corn price movements. If a crop input supplier owns resources that afford it 
bargaining power, then it should be able to participate in gains from a non-transient increase in 
                                                 
5 From http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Tyson_Foods_(TSN), retrieved 8/4/09. 
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corn prices. In the next section we develop a two-factor equilibrium share price model to 
discern the extent of a firm’s capacity to profit from favorable corn price movements. 
 
4.  The Empirical Model and Data 
To empirically evaluate the impact of U.S. biofuel policy on the stock prices of agricultural 
companies in seed, fertilizer, farm equipment and meat processing sectors, we assume that 
firm-specific stock returns are largely determined by the general market risk premium and a 
common risk factor represented by corn price. Our linear two-factor capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) is specified as 
(8)  2, , 0, 1, , , 2, , , , ,( ) , ~ (0,t i t f i i t m t f i t C t i t i t iR R R R R Nβ β β ε ε σ− = + − + + );
where time  returns on individual stock  and the markets are denoted by t i ,t iR  and ,t mR , 
respectively. Excess stock (market) returns, , ,t i t fR R−  ( ,t m t f,R R− ), are obtained after 
subtracting risk-free rate ,t fR . Returns on corn is given by movement in corn futures contract 
prices and is represented by ,t CR .  
Specifically, returns ,  ( , ,t k )R k i m C=  are considered as continuously compounded and 
calculated as the natural log of changes over consecutive daily prices, i.e., . 
To calculate returns, daily closing stock prices  are adjusted to account for historical 
corporate actions such as stock splits, dividends, distributions and rights offerings. The closing 
value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 composite price index is employed to represent the general 
market price . Settlement prices for December-maturity corn futures contracts traded on the 
Chicago Board of Trade are used to represent corn price . Expiring contracts are rolled over 
into the next December contract on the last trading day of November, a few weeks prior to 
, ,ln( / )t k t k t kR P P−= 1,
,t iP
,t mP
,t CP
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contract expiration.6 The risk-free rate ,t fR  is the three-month Treasury bill secondary market 
rate.7  
Selected firms in seed, fertilizer, machinery and poultry/pork processing industries and 
their stock tickers, sample periods and revenues in 2008 are listed in Table 1. All firms are 
leading companies and play important roles in specific sectors, with all but one of these stocks 
continuing to trade daily on the NYSE and NASDAQ markets (as of August 2009). The 
exception is Pioneer Hi-bred International, Inc. (formerly NYSE: PHB), which was delisted 
after the acquisition by DuPont (Public, NYSE: DD) in October 1999. We pick up coverage of 
DuPont commencing October 1999. Historical stock price and S&P 500 index data are 
collected from the website of Yahoo! Finance.  
In the empirical finance literature, it has long been recognized and widely documented that 
daily financial return series display strong conditional heteroskedasticity. In order to produce 
appropriate and efficient estimation, corrections for heteroskedasticity must be made. ARCH 
and GARCH models have been very successful in doing so and are widely used. Bollerslev, 
Engle and Nelson (1994) provide a comprehensive overview of this matter. To test for ARCH 
effects in our data, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test proposed by Engle (1982) is applied. The 
test results presented in Table 2 indicate the presence of significant ARCH effects in all stock 
return series except for those of Mosaic and CF Industries. The failure to reject the no-ARCH 
null hypotheses for these two companies may be because of their relatively short sample 
periods.  
                                                 
6 The return on the rollover date is calculated using the prior date within the appropriate price 
series. 
7 Data were retrieved from the Federal Reserve System website: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Download.aspx?rel=H15&series=bd891f9aa455
467f8e6d0abbd14eda18&from=01/02/1990&to=06/02/2009&lastObs=&filetype=spreadsheet
ml&label=include&layout=seriescolumn.  
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Of theARCH/GARCH type models, GARCH(1,1), as introduced in Bollerslev (1986), is 
the mostly widely used specification. It has proved to be a superior model and is 
parsimoniously parameterized (Hansen and Lunde, 2005). Therefore, the conditional 
heteroskedasticity of individual excess stock return is modeled as  
(9)  2 2, 1 1, 1 ,t i t i t iσ ω α ε γ σ− −= + + 2 1,
where 1α  and 1γ  are the so-called ARCH and GARCH effects. Equations (8) and (9) are 
jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood method, and standard errors are computed 
using the robust method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). The estimates are presented in 
Table 2.  
 
5.  Discussion 
Results in Table 2 provide strong support for our hypotheses. It can be seen from the 2β  
coefficients that an increase in corn prices tends to increase excess stock returns for companies 
in the seed, fertilizer and machinery sectors. The impacts on meat processing companies are 
negative. Of the sixteen companies considered, all are of the hypothesized sign. Seven have 
corn price coefficients that are significant at the 1% level while six are not significant at the 
10% level. Four of five fertilizer companies have corn coefficients that are significant at the 
1% level while Terra Nitrogen is not significant at the 10% level. All three farm machinery 
companies have strongly significant corn coefficients. Seed and meat protein companies are 
generally less significant. For seed companies, Monsanto and Syngenta have corn coefficients 
that are significant at the 5% level while Pioneer and DuPont, the chemical company that took 
it over, do not have significant corn coefficients. Interestingly, three of the six corn coefficients 
that are not significant at 10% are among the four meat protein companies.  
The absolute values of the corn coefficients range from 0.01 to 0.19 with average value of 
0.07, where 0.07 would imply that a 1% increase in the corn price level increases the stock 
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price by 0.07%. In that case, a $1.4/bushel increase from $2.00 to $3.40, which is broadly what 
has happened over the 2006-09 period, should increase company value by about 4.9%. The 
effect is not large, but bear in mind that some corn price movements may be perceived as 
transient, because of temporary shocks on the supply or demand side. Further, the presence of 
competitors will limit a firm’s capacity to take advantage of higher corn prices by re-pricing 
corn inputs while growers can also adjust their input intensity and/or mix if re-pricing does 
occur.8  
Although the included companies are quite comparable in terms of diversification and 
market dominance in their sectors, responses to corn price changes are heterogeneous. The 
corresponding estimated 2β  coefficients show an interesting pattern for seed, meat processing 
and machinery sectors. The coefficients, which quantify the magnitudes of biofuel policy 
impacts, are generally larger for relatively smaller companies. We define company size by total 
revenue over the 2008 accounting year, and these data are presented in Table 1. For example, 
the revenue of Deere & Co. was $28.3 billion while that of CNH was $18.5 billion. The 
respective corn coefficient estimates were 0.06 and 0.12.  
This observation is consistent with the standard Cournot oligopoly model. A reason for this 
pattern could be that larger firms in an oligopoly market have lower unit costs and so have 
higher unit margins. If this is the case, a permanent increase in demand would increase small-
firm unit profits by proportionately more than it would larger-firm unit profits. But for fertilizer 
companies, the pattern is contrary to that observed in the other sectors. The lower the revenue a 
fertilizer company generates, the lower the potential impact a corn price change has, except for 
the case of CF Industries. We do not have a satisfactory explanation for why the fertilizer 
                                                 
8 Huffman (2009) has noted the role of plant population per planted corn acre in North 
American yield improvements during the latter part of the twentieth century. To some extent, 
more plants mean less sunlight per plant. Farmers can respond to more expensive seed prices 
by reducing corn acres or reducing the seeding rate. 
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sector should be different. The results for Pioneer and DuPont should be viewed with some 
caution. Bear in mind that the data for Pioneer were from the pre-ethanol era and that DuPont 
is a diversified company with interests across a variety of petrochemical markets. Linkages 
between corn and oil prices could reduce the estimated stock price sensitivity to corn prices.  
The estimation results for companies in the meat processing sector are relatively 
insignificant. This could be in part due to the offsetting impact of the ethanol by-product, 
distillers dried grains, which can also be used as a feedstock. An alternative explanation 
concerns the effect on the costs of rivals, and especially on very small farm-level meat protein 
suppliers. An increase in corn costs may adversely affect these smaller firms more than it does 
the larger firms. It is conceivable that the largest meat protein suppliers would take some 
solace in assuming a more dominant role in the sector as smaller firms exit. For example, the 
companies remaining after a market shakeout may be better positioned to profit from product 
development and quality control investments. 
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
Using a two-factor asset pricing model, we quantify the impact of biofuels policy on stock 
prices of sixteen companies in various agricultural inputs and meat processing sectors. After 
controlling for overall market excess return, corn price increases are found to have positive 
effects on excess stock returns for seed, fertilizer and farm equipment companies, while the 
impact on meat companies is negative. Although the effects are not large, they provide some 
evidence that off-farm input suppliers gain from policies intended to promote corn-based 
ethanol. 
Several possible extensions emerge from our investigation. The statistical insignificance of 
results for how corn prices affect meat protein excess stock returns deserves further attention. 
After all, one of the considered companies went into bankruptcy protection over the study 
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period, citing corn prices as a reason (Smith, 2009). And concerns about bankruptcy suggest 
that agribusiness stock price variability may also be affected by the corn price level. Evidence 
on this might be gleaned from how credit and credit derivative markets vary with commodity 
prices.  
Another speculation is that agribusiness responses to corn prices would have been very 
different before ethanol became a significant use of corn. In recent years, corn futures markets 
have responded strongly to evidence on the strength of support for corn biofuels legislation and 
demand for biofuels. Such evidence is likely to have persistent effects on company profitability 
and thus on company valuation. In earlier times, supply shocks were the dominant factor 
moving corn futures markets. Supply shocks are less likely to persist, since corn stocks are 
likely to be replenished after a bad harvest because of near-horizon price rationing, additional 
plantings and a return to normal weather patterns. While supply-side shocks may move 
company profitability for a year or two, the effect on the stock price would likely be small. A 
test for structural change in stock price responses to corn price movements may establish 
whether investors agree with this line of reasoning. 
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Table 1. Selected Firms in the U.S. Stock Market 
Sector/Company Ticker Sample Period 12-Month Revenue (ending 
12/31/08, in millions of U.S. 
dollars) 
Seed    
DuPont NYSE: DD 10/01/1999-
06/02/2009 
31,836
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. NYSE: PHB 10/08/1975- 
10/1/1999 
N/A
Monsanto Co. NYSE: MON 10/24/2000-
06/02/2009 
11,365
Syngenta AG (ADR) NYSE: SYT 11/15/2000-
06/02/2009 
11,624
Fertilizer   
Mosaic Co. NYSE: MOS 10/26/2004-
06/02/2009 
10,298
Agrium Inc.  NYSE: AGU 05/05/1995-
06/02/2009 
10,031
PotashCorp of Saskatchewan, Inc. NYSE: POT 04/05/1990-
06/02/2009 
9,446
CF Industries, Inc. NYSE: CF 08/11/2005-
06/02/2009 
3,921
Terra Nitrogen Co. NYSE: TNH 0//10/1992- 
06/02/2009 
903
Meat Protein   
Tyson Foods, Inc. NYSE: TSN 01/02/1990-
06/02/2009 
26,862
Smithfield Foods, Inc. NYSE: SFD 03/26/1990-
06/02/2009 
12,478
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. OTC: PGPDQ 12/04/2003-
06/02/2009 
8,525
Sanderson Farms, Inc. NASD: SAFM 01/02/1990- 1,724
20 
 
06/02/2009 
Ag. Machinery   
Deere & Co. NYSE: DE 01/04/1982-
06/02/2009 
28,292
CNH Global NYSE: CNH 11/01/1996-
06/02/2009 
18,476
AGCO Corp. NYSE: AGCO 04/20/1992-
06/02/2009 
8,425
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Table 2. Estimation Results 
 
Variables DD PHB MON SYT MOS AGU POT CF TNH 
0β  <0.001 (0.10) -0.01*** (-6.91) <0.001 (0.30) -0.002** (-2.28) 0.004* (1.93) -0.003* (-4.08) -0.003*** (-5.39) 0.005** (2.47) -0.007*** (-6.02) 
1β  1.00*** (77.76) 0.93*** (99.39) 0.96*** (43.35) 0.91*** (44.29) 1.06*** (22.17) 0.90*** (49.85) 0.90*** (66.67) 1.06*** (21.50) 0.80*** (30.30) 
2β  0.01 (0.42) 0.02 (1.15) 0.06** (2.22) 0.05** (2.07) 0.19*** (4.25) 0.09*** (3.53) 0.08*** (4.05) 0.17*** (3.29) 0.04 (1.07) 
1α  0.03** (2.55) 0.12*** (2.68) 0.04*** (2.60) 0.03* (1.65) 0.08** (1.99) 0.04** (2.36) 0.04*** (4.26) 0.07*** (2.84) 0.092 (1.48) 
1γ  0.96*** (60.06) 0.79*** (9.84) 0.96*** (58.62) 0.96*** (40.11) 0.92*** (24.25) 0.95*** (40.86) 0.96*** (94.41) 0.92*** (43.00) 0.91*** (15.79) 
ω  <0.001 
(1.36) 
<0.001** 
(2.05) 
<0.001 
(1.04) 
<0.001 
(0.86) 
<0.001 
(1.04) 
<0.001 
(1.44) 
<0.001** 
(2.04) 
<0.001 
(1.35) 
<0.001 
(1.18) 
Wald  2 (2)χ 6047.35*** 9917.62*** 1897.92*** 1967.73*** 519.82*** 2489.35*** 4495.48*** 490.66*** 922.83*** 
ARCH test 64.43*** 132.57*** 33.15*** 102.83*** 0.21 45.21*** 48.46*** 1.03 145.68*** 
 
Variables TSN SFD PGPDQ SAFM DE CNH AGCO 
0β  -0.003*** (-4.47) -0.004*** (-5.03) -0.001 (-0.31) -0.003*** (-3.47) -0.004*** (-7.23) -0.003* (-1.95) 0.001 (1.11) 
1β  0.92*** (61.43) 0.89*** (47.10) 0.94*** (10.96) 0.91*** (43.41) 0.91*** (89.75) 0.92*** (26.78) 1.01*** (40.50) 
2β  -0.01 (-0.44) -0.04 (-1.58) -0.03 (-0.71) -0.05* (-1.73) 0.06*** (2.84) 0.12*** (3.34) 0.10*** (3.31) 
1α  0.02** (2.20) 0.02*** (2.88) 0.29 (1.55) 0.12** (2.30) 0.07*** (4.06) 0.03*** (5.58) 0.12* (1.91) 
1γ  0.98*** (72.88) 0.98*** (140.55) 0.68*** (3.88) 0.74*** (5.70) 0.91*** (38.03) 0.97*** (180.95) 0.84*** (10.88) 
ω  <0.001 
(1.02) 
<0.001 
(1.01) 
<0.001 
(1.21) 
<0.001 
(1.61) 
<0.001** 
(2.26) 
<0.001 
(0.82) 
<0.001 
(1.56) 
Wald  2 (2)χ 3776.29*** 2225.88*** 133.81*** 1886.66*** 8076.94*** 722.62*** 1702.5*** 
ARCH test 106.38*** 83.74*** 51.10*** 19.70*** 547.62*** 8.84*** 27.29*** 
Notes: 1. Single (*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 2. For the LM ARCH test, *, **, and 
*** denote that the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. One lag of squared residuals is 
included for the test. 3. z  values, calculated from Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors, are in the parentheses. 4. The null hypothesis of the Wald chi-
square test is that the two coefficients of interest are simultaneously equal to zero.  
